Prof. Dr. Gerd Langguth 

Department of Political Science, University of Bonn

Speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation

in Washington, D.C., July 30, 2002

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The differing reactions to the atrocious attacks of September 11 on either side of the Atlantic are an expression of different power structures and political cultures. The wave of sympathy and the expression of "unlimited solidarity" with the U.S. cannot conceal a different approach on the part of Europeans toward the terrorism practiced by Islamic extremists, despite the fact that the latter represents a global threat. The political elite in Germany and most European countries are well aware of the importance of the strategic support provided by the U.S. through the NATO alliance. Nevertheless, we can now see signs of a more sober attitude or even disappointment in the U.S., which is calling into question the efficiency of European measures to combat terrorism. The following ten theses are designed to illuminate the reasons why the relationship between the U.S. on the one side, and the Europeans and Germans on the other, has become more difficult lately.

The U.S. and the Europeans must to work together within the international community to ensure adoption of their conviction that "freedom fighters" should in no way be recognized as "military" forces and thus not fall under the protection of international law covering combatants.

There is no universally accepted definition of "terrorism", which nonetheless should be understood as a premeditated, specific and political-ideological act of violence committed by governments, organizations controlled by governments, or organizations, persons or groups of people not associated with governments against states, ethnic groups, specific social classes, or religious or political groups. Above all, terrorism involves acts of violence committed against civilians with the goal of generating fear and panic and therefore causing the destabilization of the social order its perpetrators seek to destroy.

This is why the German people have an underdeveloped sense of the danger at this time. Europe has long been confronted with the challenge of what has been historically based terrorism limited to specific regions. Perhaps this is the reason why it seems as though Europeans have in a way "grown accustomed to" terrorism. In the 1970s, the activities of the Red Army Faction and other terrorist organizations appeared to pose a threat to the internal stability of Germany. At that time, the country was the subject of much negative international coverage — in the U.S. as well — due to certain legal measures it had undertaken to battle terrorism (e.g. the so-called contact embargo law). This fact makes it easier for Germans to empathize with many Americans who currently feel themselves misunderstood by the world. And whereas no real danger is posed at this time by "domestic" terrorist groups in Germany, there is real terrorism in other parts of Europe, such as that practiced by the Basque underground organization ETA in Spain, left extremists terrorists including several who were arrested recently in Greece, and separatists on the French island of Corsica in the Mediterranean. It also remains to be seen whether the terrorism of the IRA in Northern Ireland and Great Britain is truly now a thing of the past, despite the recent "apology" made by that organization.

Terrorism such as that practiced by Osama bin Laden is targeted at and affects Western civilization as a whole. Germany has too long been tolerant of foreign extremist groups operating in the country, and the threat posed by such organizations has been underestimated.

The fact that Germans and other Europeans are in danger is amply demonstrated by the terrorist attack planned for Strasbourg, the implementation of which was foiled at the last minute in Frankfurt at the end of 2000, or the murder of tourists, most of whom were German, at the La Ghriba synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba on April 11, 2002. We must assume that Islamic extremists will commit further acts of terrorism. There are nearly 60,000 foreign political extremists in Germany, and Islamic groups account for 31,950 of these (2002), which means that they pose the largest extremist potential in the country. Of special note here is the power exercised by the "Caliph of Cologne," who is currently serving a prison term for inciting the murder of one of his rivals. The stated objective of Metin Kaplan, as he is actually called, is to establish a "caliphate state" — in other words, a parallel society in Germany. Until it was banned in December 2001, Kaplan’s organization was the second most powerful Turkish-Islamic group in Germany, with some 1,100 members spread across seven German states. Many of the extremists are now German citizens, while others are exploiting German refugee laws. Naturally, they enjoy basic civil rights and benefit from stringent data protection laws, and they can be investigated by the police only if there is solid evidence that they have committed a crime or are planning to do so.

All free societies must prepare themselves for the fact that Islamic-oriented parallel societies are coming into being which define themselves through their unequivocal opposition to a pluralistic society and a culture formed by majority rule.

Such parallel societies can offer fertile ground for the recruitment of fanatical extremists. The terrorist cells uncovered in Germany offer proof that some of the terrorists did not enter the country as "sleepers," but instead experienced something of an religious "awakening experience" with Islam after having arrived. In other words, the sons of middle-class Arab families were unable to cope with life in the pluralistic Western world.

Without strong support from the U.S., it will be impossible for Germany and the rest of the EU to fight terrorism. At the same time, without effective measures by the Europeans to combat terrorism in Europe, the actions undertaken by the U.S. around the world will not have the full impact.

The Europeans, however, now see themselves confronted by U.S. politicians who they believe are acting with a new impatience. It sometimes seems to them as if the U.S. would prefer to assign a "Canadian status" to the Europeans — in other words, the role of a generally friendly alliance partner whose political opinions are not taken particularly seriously. The fact is, however, that intensive cooperation is required at all levels — between politicians, military officials and intelligence services — if the long battle against terrorism is to be won. Even a world power like the U.S. will need the support of its European partners (for UN resolutions, logistics, overfly authorization etc.) if it wishes to undertake further international operations. America’s "special relationship" with Britain will not be enough here.

As the world’s only remaining superpower, the U.S. tends to rely more strongly on its ability to deploy force, to use "power" as such, whereas the European countries are more inclined toward diplomatic activities, consultations and — when it comes to arms control — systems of verification. Europeans strive to achieve peace on a multilateral basis, and on a continent strongly influenced by pacifism there are few who believe that long-lasting peace can be achieved only through military pressure or outright force. Assessments of countries as "purveyors of evil" appear too simplified to Europeans with their particular culture of political discourse, and such assessments are strongly rejected on intellectual grounds and because of a tendency to make finer distinctions. Europeans also differentiate between whether a possible attack on Iraq and Saddam Hussein should be made on account of alleged support for Al Qaida, which has yet to be clearly proven, or as a response to Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction, which poses a special threat to Europe as well. The attempt for a time to link the issue of the International Criminal Court — which was finally approved by the Clinton administration — with the deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina was viewed in Europe as a form of extortion. The Europeans, for their part, fail to appreciate Washington’s concern about becoming too dependent on uncertain majorities in the Security Council. At the same time, the U.S. occasionally forgets the fact that any military measures to be undertaken by Germany are subject to approval by the Bundestag, which is why we in Germany speak of a "parliamentary army." German reservations regarding the use of force internationally, originally something desired by the Allies after World War II, have become part of the nation’s consciousness, the result being a long and drawn-out decision-making process regarding such issues.

Although, as stated, the German decision-making process is somewhat complex, the Germans were among the first to confirm the validity of the application of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which refers to the provision of assistance in the event of an attack on a NATO member state. German Special Forces are now side by side with American and other allied forces in a dangerous combat situation in Afghanistan. Next to Turkey, Germany accounts for the largest contingent (each with around 25 percent) of the UN-mandated ISAF peacekeeping force stationed around Kabul (total strength: 4,800 troops; Turkey: 1,370; Germany: 1,200; France: 500; Great Britain: 400; Italy: 400). The U.S. is not participating in this force. German navy units have also been deployed to the Horn of Africa in connection with the Afghanistan mission, and the German armed forces remain active in various out-of-area operations, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr, an expensive compulsory army which had a purely defensive function during the Cold War, has in fact been undergoing difficult reorganization into a rapid deployment force for quite some time in order to ensure its ability to conduct operations outside the area covered by the NATO treaty. This effort is, however, suffering greatly from a lack of proper financing.

The EU and NATO are very important to America because they prevent the political isolation of the U.S., even when it acts unilaterally. The U.S. needs to know that it can expect the EU and, above all, its NATO allies to be long-standing partners whose similar political convictions guarantee that they will remain loyal partners over the long term and not only in times of short-term shared interests.

The current beneficiary of the international anti-terror alliance is Russia, which has taken advantage of the opportunity to be "upgraded" by the U.S. as a member of the "coalition of the willing." President Putin has gained much from his anti-terror partnership with the U.S.: Chechnya has become virtually a non-issue; Russia is now a de facto member of NATO. Moreover, Russia has been designated a free-market economy and has also been promoted to equal partnership in the group of the most important industrialized nations. Russia — and perhaps China — appear to the U.S. at the moment to be partners easier to deal with in the war against terrorism than the complicated and in many respects disunited Europeans.

The terrorist threat is a global one and the response to it must therefore be global as well. A decision on the specific form such a response should take will have to be made at the NATO summit in November 2002 in Prague, especially also in view of the fact that the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan is not a NATO operation. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the formulation of a European Security and Defense Policy are also reactions to the demands made by the U.S. for the Europeans to take on greater responsibility in a multi-polar world. The planned security policy elements in the EU need to be designed in a manner that enables synergies with respect to NATO resources. In other words, any conflicting policies with respect to NATO must be avoided. Europe must develop the strategic ability to expand its military operating radius and this will also involve eliminating the technological deficiencies in its armed forces.

An effective global response to the terrorist threat will only be possible if the U.S. and Europe intelligently coordinate their activities. Endurance is required, since the terrorist threat is directed against all pluralistic and liberal societies. Unscrupulous extremists exploit poverty in many parts of the world in order to wage a cultural-religious battle against the West. Both Europe and the U.S. must help ensure long-term economic progress and development in societies and regions plagued by crises and terror — preventive and follow-up measures will be required here as well. Europeans must make a greater effort to formulate policies for decisively combating terror, something which would perhaps be easier if the U.S. displayed a greater understanding for the specifics of European political culture.