Aussenpolitik - German Foreign Affairs Review: Vol. 47 / No. 4, 1996

Gerd Langguth

Dawn of the ”Pacific Century”?

At a time of globalization, with the world growing closer together through, among other things, new media and information technologies, dialogue on values within the framework of international politics is increasingly important. International relations no longer consist of just bilateral relations between classic nation-states and groups of states (such as the European Union, ASEAN, NAFTA or the Mercosur), but are becoming more closely interwoven with respective domestic policy discussions and situations.

German and European politics must be on its guard against an excessively Eurocentric perception rooted in history. At the beginning of the First World War the ”Western” empires had over 85 per cent of the land on this planet at their disposal. Bearing this in mind it is easier to understand why some of the nations and ethnic groups which viewed themselves for centuries as exploited and domesticated by the European powers now want to go their own way (1). This not only applies to the part of the world in which Islam has a formative influence, but above all to Asia too, from which persistently anti-Western resentment has emanated for years. Is an ”Asian century” about to dawn which defines itself through confrontation with the West?

There can be no doubt about it: Asia's — especially Southeast Asia's — dynamic political and economic policy development has radically reshaped Asia's political and cultural landscape. Asia has good reason to face the USA and the Europeans with greater self-confidence. The fact that almost all heads of governments of the 15 EU member states convened with their colleagues from ten Asian countries at the first European-Asian summit meeting at the beginning of March 1996 in Bangkok symbolises the greater importance Europe attaches to Asia. An undoubtedly important aspect from the Asian viewpoint was the accompanying political signal of countering the political and economic influence of the USA in Asia through a stronger relational network with Europe and, at the same time, creating a counterbalance to Japan and China. Nevertheless, voices could be heard in connection with this astonishing summit which did not sound particularly flattering to European ears. Some Asian media simply interpreted the summit as a continuation of Western imperialism, now to be realised with the help of trade relations. In the Far Eastern part of Asia especially there is a growing call for a separate Asian way, and every effort was made prior to the summit to ensure that the human rights discussion would not become a disruptive factor for the harmony of this meeting. Nevertheless, German and European politics must face up to the fundamental questions raised by the Asian values offensive.

Risk of Eurocentrism

The warning against excessive Eurocentrism is bound up with the fact that the significance of Asia in Germany and Europe has still not been sufficiently ”discovered”, despite the Asia Concept developed by the German government and the European Union (EU) and even though about fifty per cent of the world's population lives in Asia. This is revealed by a glance at the historical relations between Europe and Asia. Germany's Emperor William spoke of the ”yellow peril”, and Karl Marx claimed that the Asians could not represent themselves but that they had to let themselves be represented. This explains his reference to an ”Asian mode of production” (2). Although Max Weber (3) does not work on the assumption of a single Asian societal order — he mainly draws a distinction between Confucianism and Taoism in China and Hinduism and Buddhism in India, Japan and other countries — he sees a fundamental difference in all cases to the European model of society which produced capitalism. Accordingly, Asian societies were not able to establish capitalism through their own effort. It should not be inferred that they were fundamentally incapable of establishing capitalism. In Max Weber's opinion, however, capitalism in Asia is a model imported from the West. The success story of capitalism in Asia was not foreseeable at the time when Weber wrote his analyses on the sociology of religion at the beginning of the 1920s.

The difficulties involved in defining ”Asian” values also apply to the European context. Nevertheless, despite language differences Europe is much more homogeneous due to the largely Christian-influenced culture. The term ”Western” always encompasses the United States of America too. Since the 15th century it was mainly the Europeans, joined by the North Americans since the 18th century, who exerted a politically determinant influence up until the outbreak of the Second World War. The term ”Westernness” has numerous indicators, dimensions and implications: ”It is the sum total of the integral elements of a Jewish-Mediterranean-Christian civilisation, which began in Asia Minor and Egypt several millennia before Christ, was given more distinct contours by Greece and Rome through the claim to cultural and technical supremacy over the rest of the known world, and which, also decisively influenced by the cultural ascendancy of the Islamic world in the European Middle Ages, felt strong enough at the beginning of the modern age to make universalistic claims and to imperialistically safeguard this self-assessment step by step”(4).

As already indicated, the question of the claim to universality by Western values became — after the end of the East-West conflict which had such a formative influence on world politics for decades — one of the decisive problems of international politics — especially in connection with the search for a ”New World Order”, as proclaimed by the then US President George Bush in his state-of-the-nation address on 17 January 1991. The question arises as to whether the ”West” could and should retain its monopolised claim to paradigms of civilisation. With his ”end of history” thesis, Francis Fukuyama (5) has taken part in this discussion as has Samuel P. Huntington with his now famous article ”The Clash of Civilisations?” (6). The latter contends that the clash of civilisations will dominate world politics. Accordingly, the conflicts will not be primarily of an ideological or economic nature, but culturally determined, even though nation-states will remain the most powerful global players. Huntington claims that the next world war, if there is one at all, will be a war between civilisations (7). These claims provoked a host of statements in the field of science and politics, particularly in Arab countries and in Asia.

Due to the Christian faith the key question in the West relates to the personal responsibility and guilt of individuals. Even if Asian criticism of Western thinking mainly emphasises individualism in its exaggerated form Western thinking has no uniform view of the responsibility of the individual. It is fair to assume that in the USA more importance is attached to the role of the individual and less to that of the state than in, for example, Germany, where, as a rule, both a collectivistic image of man as well as an exaggeratedly individualistic understanding of personal responsibility are rejected. Divergent perceptions of the role of the state exist, therefore, which play an extremely varying role in individual European countries — for example, in the field of economic activities. France, for example, presents a contrast to Britain, Germany or the USA. The so-called Western values, however, are strongly determined by the basic demand of the French revolution. Freedom, justice and solidarity rank as the main ”Western basic values”. Apart from the victory of individual rationality ”Westernness” also includes the separation of church and state and, in the final analysis, the ”capitalist mode of production”, even though this is not undisputed in all pluralistic states. It is precisely this Westernness which freed Asia from its backwardness, as even the state founder of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, explains: ”We would have been a backward economy with a backward society. But we do not want all of the West” (8).

It is obvious that the question of human rights is a constant point of friction between representatives of ”Western” and a number of representatives of ”Asian” values. It should not be forgotten that in Europe too — and this particularly applies to Germany — democracy was often not able to assert itself until the twentieth century, but a development towards the rule of law began at a relatively early stage. In Europe too, therefore, democracy, legal certainty and human rights first established themselves during the course of a lengthy process which met with considerable cultural, religious and traditional opposition along the way. Just a few reminders in this context: the ”Magna Charta Libertatum” of 1215, the ”Habeas Corpus Act” of 1679, the ”Bill of Rights” of 1689, the basic rights of Virginia of 1776, the (French) declaration of human and civil rights of 1789 (and 1791), the German St. Paul's Church constitution of 1849, or the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949.

What is Asia?

What do the terms ”Asia” and ”Asian values” actually mean? Whereas, for example, Latin America — on account of the use of the Spanish and Portuguese languages in at least all of the larger countries — is relatively homogeneous in cultural terms despite considerable variety the question of Asia's common cultural bond requires a different approach. Excluding the traditionally Islamic region (from Turkey to Pakistan), Asia presents a host of religions and religiously inspired weltanschauungen. In many countries the situation is complicated by the fact that the missionary activity did not involve the classic, standardising European combination of church and state, enabling overlappings of different religions, syncretisms or the retention of popular beliefs.

A look at the Asian map confirms these cultural differences: the Indian subcontinent with India and Nepal has a mainly Hindu character. A strong minority exists in Indonesia (Bali). Above all Malaysia (with Brunei), Indonesia, and Bangladesh are Islamic, with Indonesia and its roughly 200 million inhabitants as the most populous Islamic state in the world. In the case of Buddhism the situation is more complicated. It has above all a formative influence in Indochina. In Thailand and Bhutan, Buddhism is the state religion, and in Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Sri Lanka the majority religion. Other currents of Buddhism determine religious life in Tibet (Lamaism) and Mongolia. It is impossible to define the religious character of China, Japan and Korea in terms of majority and minority concepts. In China, there is a juxtaposition, even down to the level of individual persons, of traditional Chinese popular beliefs, Buddhism and Confucianism (9), which, however, is to viewed more as an ethical or moral view of the world. There is a similar situation in Singapore, where the population is to a large extent of Chinese descent. Furthermore, there are also Christians in China. In Japan, there is a parallelism of Buddhism and Shintoism, the traditional Japanese religion. In addition to the community of Buddhism and Confucianist doctrines in Korea there is a substantial Christian section of the population. The Philippines with its mainly Christian character is a special case. Australia and New Zealand, which tend to belong to the Western-Christian world in cultural terms, must also rank as part of the Asia-Pacific region. Sweeping statements on Asia, therefore, are bound to be misjudgements in view of the fact that it is the continent with the greatest variety in geographical, cultural, religious, language, and political terms. Consequently, it is much more difficult to define Asian values than European ones, since the discussion on values in each Asian country varies due to the heterogeneous religious background. The limitation of the discussion on values to Confucianism alone, which often occurs in the European discussion, is a clear oversimplification.

The Arguments of the Advocates of ”Asianism”

There are a number of striking initiatives which reflect the process of decolonialisation in Asia. The hand-over of the British Crown Colony Hong Kong on 1 June 1997 and, finally, the withdrawal of the Portuguese from Macao in 1999 symbolise this process. The last colonial remnants , so to speak, in Asia will then fall. Despite the — admittedly, now very thinned out — military presence of the USA the motto ”Asia for the Asians” is increasingly fulfilling itself. This will probably encourage a discussion on ”Asianism”. The ”Commission for a New Asia” constituted in Kuala Lumpur in 1993, which consists of prominent persons from thirteen Asian countries, advocated that ”we (the Asians — the author) must restore our self-confidence, our faith and our pride” (10). The founder of the Asia Times — a newspaper which is printed simultaneously in Bangkok, Hong Kong and Singapore —, the Thai Sondhi Limthongkul, even called for an ”Asian nationalism” (11). Many other examples of the Asian we-feeling could confirm the discussion on the Asian renaissance, whose aim is to point to the Asian culture and to economic and political achievements full of pride. Asia is to be depicted as the ”cradle of civilisation”. There are, of course, varying perceptions in the Asian identity discussion. The main spokespersons of a moderate line include the Korean politician and prominent champion of human rights, Kim Dae Jung, and the Philippine head of state, Fidel Ramos, who has often energetically countered the ”no development without democracy” thesis forwarded by the ”Singapore school” of state founder Lee Kuan Yew (12). The ”hawks” among the Asian politicians, on the other hand, contend that Asian pride can only be brought about through heavy criticism of the West, in particular of the USA. Which arguments do the critics of the West use? There are four main recurrent theses:

1. ”The West is decadent”

The main accusation is the allegedly growing decadence of the West. Lee Kuan Yew counters with a ”well-ordered society” aimed at ensuring ”that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedom”. And, finally: ”This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy” (13). The special sense of family fostered by Confucianism and the need to respect older generations are repeatedly emphasised — and the fact that the individual in Asian societies lives in the context of his family (14). Nevertheless, Lee Kuan Yew stressed in a speech given in Munich in June 1996 that there was a risk that even in Singapore the traditional values would soon be hollowed out by economic development (15). The qualification and employment of women had weakened the cohesion of the family, to which so much importance had been attached in Singaporean society. Furthermore, it was difficult today to completely control the penetration of Western values, for example, through television and the media. The citizens of Singapore were fond of travel and, in addition, were confronted with other ideas abroad (16). The exaggerated individualism of the West contrasted with the families and community orientated ethics of an Asia with a Confucianist character, and the subordination to the community had enabled Asia's upswing in the first place and had been one of the foundations for Singapore's success.

The Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad takes an even tougher line. Together with the Japanese politician Shintaro Ishihara (17) he published a book in 1995 entitled ”The Voice of Asia” (18) which outstrips all comparable statements through the aggressive character of its content. With reference to the ”end of the western world” announced by Oswald Spengler, Mahathir quite simply accuses the West of ”hedonism”: ”Materialism, sensual gratification, and selfishness are rife. The community has given way to the individual and his desires. The inevitable consequence has been the breakdown of established institutions and diminished respect for marriage, family values, elders, and important customs, conventions, and traditions. These have been replaced by a new set of values based largely on the rejection of all that relates to spiritual faith and communal life. Hence, Western societies are riddled with single-parent families, which foster incest, with homosexuality, with cohabitation, with unrestrained avarice, with disrespect for others and, of course, with rejection of religious teachings and values” (19).

2. ”The West is arrogant”

The ignorance and arrogance of the West towards Asians is then addressed. A country such as the USA — Kishore Mahbubani, state secretary in the Singapore Foreign Office argues —, which was confronted with ”massive social decline”, for example, through the disintegration of family structures, should act humbly in Asia. However, instead of travelling abroad with humility the Americans had self-assuredly preached about the benefits of unrestricted individual freedom and inconsiderately ignored the visible social consequences. Western values were not faultless. Some were good, some were bad. However, the West had to be viewed from the outside to see this clearly. And to recognise how the West was is working on its own decline with its own hands (20).

Mahathir goes even further by fiercely criticising Christianity which he indirectly equates with the Europeans: ”They sent missionaries to the countries of the Pacific, for example, to convert people to Christianity and civilise them. Of course, this was ridiculous because we had an advanced civilisation centuries before Europe. Europeans never felt they had to convert to Eastern religions when they enjoyed the fruits of Eastern civilisations, yet they had this notion that Christianity was indispensable to progress. Even today Westerners generally cannot rid themselves of this sense of superiority” (21). And, finally: ”The West has a long history of aggressive wars fought in an ongoing campaign to Westernise the world: no Asian country has ever invaded another country to ”Easternise” it” (22).

Nevertheless, Christianity per se is not held to blame for many of the misdevelopments: ”What is at the root of this sense of superiority? Some may say, it is intolerant Christianity, but I don't think the fault lies there. Indeed, superiority over others is not compatible with the teachings of Christianity. Rather it comes from the perception that white people are better than coloured people. It is a racial and a cultural phenomenon, not a matter of religion” (23). Mahathir works on the basis of extremely sweeping assumptions, which imply that Europeans generally feel a sense of superiority over Asians: ”Europeans felt they were a superior people with a superior culture and had a duty to civilise the world, which meant, first of all, converting people to Christianity”(24).

3. ”The West has double standards”

Kishore Mahbubani criticises the ”double standards” applied by the West: ”Oddly, for all this paranoia, the West seems to be almost deliberately pursuing a course designed to aggravate the Islamic world. The West protests against the reversal of democracy in Myanmar, Peru or Nigeria, but not in Algeria. These double standards hurt” (25). He also points out that the stance adopted by the West on Bosnia has caused tremendous damage (26). Nevertheless, Mahbubani is too much a foreign policy expert not to know that particularly the presence of the USA in Asia represents an important factor of political and military stability. He claims that the withdrawal of the West was not being welcomed everywhere and that there was still no substitute for Western, especially American supremacy. A Western withdrawal, he adds, could cause just as much damage as Western dominance” (27). And, an almost conciliatory Mahbubani remarks that the West was still the site of the great qualities and achievements of human civilisation. Many Western values illustrated the spectacular advancements of mankind: the belief in scientific research, the search for rationally guided solutions, and the willingness to question assumptions (28).

4. ”Democracy versus development”

A repeated line of argument is that an alien system cannot simply be superimposed on a country. Asked whether development in Asia and Singapore is also possible without democracy Lee Kuan Yew replied in an interview given in December 1994 that he would say that development without democracy was possible if the reference was to democracy based on the American or German model. Elections, conflicting views, and regularly changing parties were not absolutely essential in politics. However, if society's aim was industrialisation, innovation and creativity the productive forces needed to be fostered in every generation. Minds were required to create new products, new services and new artistic forms (29). In this respect the opposite of a planned society or a planned economy was required.

Mahathir also warns against a Western-style democracy: ”When citizens understand that the right to choose also involves limits and responsibilities, democracy doesn't deteriorate into an excess of freedom or in extreme cases virtual anarchy. These are the dangers of democracy gone wrong, and in our view it is precisely the sad direction in which the West is heading” (30). And he adds: ”Democratic fanatics are no better than religious fanatics”(31).

In sharp contrast, the Korean politician Kim Dae Jung responds to Lee Kuan Yew's theses: ”Culture is not necessarily our destiny. Democracy is” (32). He emphasised Asia's rich cultural heritage and the fact that Asia had a great deal to offer to the rest of the world. Its rich heritage of democratically orientated philosophies and traditions would make a significant contribution to the development of democracy worldwide. At the same time, he pointed out that Lee's view of Asian culture mainly served his own justification. In reality, the family-centred societies of East Asia had long since begun moving towards a self-centred individualism as an inevitable result of industrialisation. The moral decline was not rooted in the shortcomings of the Western cultures as such, but were attributable to industrial society as a system. The right way to cure the ailments of the industrial society did not lead via the setting up of a police state, but via an ethical education, via the communication of intellectual values, and via the encouragement of high standards in culture and art. Although there was no objection to Lee's claim that an alien system could not be simply superimposed on every society the question is whether democracy was a system which really is so alien to Asian cultures that it could not function there. Kim Dae Jung comes the conclusion that there were no ideas which advocate democracy more fundamentally than the doctrines of Confucianism, of Buddhism and of Tonghak. Asia's democratic philosophies were undeniably just as profound as those of the West (33). Accordingly, the fundamental ideas and traditions democracy requires existed in Europe as well as in Asia. Although Asians had developed these ideas long before the Europeans the latter had been the first to develop a concept for a comprehensive and effective democracy based on free elections.

Motives for the Asian Values Offensive

There are various reasons for the discussion on values in Asia. First, there is an enhanced ”we-feeling” among Asians vis-à-vis the rest of the world and, in particular, the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, this discussion should not be overrated, since it is mainly taking place in a number of ASEAN member states, above all in Malaysia and in Singapore, whereas the exchange of views on this subject in Japan and in Indonesia — where a different political self-awareness already exists on account of the greater importance of these countries — is viewed with greater detachment.

A further significant reason for the values offensive is the fact that leading circles are trying to counter the desire for democratisation in their own countries by generally attributing hedonism and decadence to the democratic societies in the West. The values discussion, however, is also being use to distract attention from the question of democracy. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung summed up this aspect as follows in a recent leader: ”Not only opposition forces in Asian countries, therefore, have long since seen through the Asian values discussion conducted by some governments for what it is: an attempt to justify undemocratic rule through reference to culture and history. When the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew argue that the Asians were community orientated and not individualistic they are thus urging their citizens to subordinate themselves to the interests of the community, which are defined by benevolent rulers” (34).

A third aspect is that some Asian societies are experiencing a rapid social and cultural change which they must cope with internally first. A country such as Japan, in which the enormous thrusts of modernisation already began in the final third of the last century, can cope with this rapid change much better than other societies which were first exposed to rapid modernisation during the last thirty to fifty years. The values discussion, therefore, is also an effort to preserve own identity and to foster the integrational capability of Asian societies — some of which, especially Malaysia, are ethnically extremely fragmented.

In this context, negative experience caused by Western colonialisation also plays a part. Germany has the advantage of not being perceived in Asia as a former colonial power. A ”breakdown of civil society” in the West is criticised : ”Guns, drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, unbecoming behaviour in public” are the arguments (35).

Western Insistence on the Indispensability of Democracy

More recent developments in Europe, Latin America, Africa, but also Asia demonstrate the appeal of democracy and of the rule of law. Democratic ways of life and legal certainty are by no means limitable to Western culture. Democracy which safeguards respective cultural identity can be achieved worldwide. It should not be forgotten that the assertion of democracy and of human rights was also a long and often painful process in Europe too. It is also undeniable that a modern democracy has extremely complicated decision-making structures. The criticism to be heard in Asia of the efficiency problems confronting democracy should not be ignored; all modern industrial societies face questions relating to their ”governability”.

However, the argument of democracy versus development is a misguided confrontation. The undeniable problems of integration of the young generation are the consequence of an — often highly accelerated — process of modernisation and industrialisation. Lee Kuan Yew himself has pointed to problematic tendencies in Singapore. Especially for this reason, however, a value-bound education in all modern societies, above all in transformation societies, is indispensable and particularly important.

The values discussion in the international context will probably tend to become more important in future as countries find isolationism increasingly difficult. The emergent ”world interior policy” will create a situation in which protesting forces striving for democracy can develop in countries where democracy is either nonexistent or where it is in a process of maturing and development. These forces will refer to the achievements of ”Western” democracies and to human rights. An interesting aspect is that human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch (36) or Freedom House (37) maintain in their annual reviews that there has been an improvement in the overall human rights situation worldwide. On the basis of an estimated global population figure of 5.7 billion people, a Freedom House analysis claims that 1.1 billion people — i.e. almost 20 per cent — live in ”free societies”, roughly 2.4 billion — about 40 per cent — in ”partially free societies”, and 2.2 billion people — just under 40 per cent — in ”not free societies”. 61 per cent of the 191 countries on this earth have democratically elected governments. Considering that, according to these statistics, only 42 per cent of all countries had democratically elected governments ten years earlier the progress is astonishing.

Democracy is also on a triumphal march in Asia too — the examples of India, Japan, and, more recently, Korea and Taiwan attest this fact. In the British Crown Colony Hong Kong conditions based initially on the rule of law and subsequently on democracy also developed — albeit enabled at a relatively late stage by the colonial regime. Today, it is hard to predict how the situation will develop after 1 July 1997. Hong Kong and Taiwan confront above all China with a challenge of democracy. The discussion on democracy and human rights must be viewed in the context of the values discussion. The allegedly ”individualistic”, ”Western” way of putting human rights into practice are countered in the discussion by ”social” human rights. The Human Rights Commission of the United Nations which convened in Geneva in April 1996 referred in this sense to a ”right to development” which should be incorporated into the definition of universal human rights. Up to now, however, it is not clear what the content of such wide-spanning rights, on which a number of developing countries pin great hopes, should be. The more a collectivistic understanding of human rights develops, the more the applicability of the rule of law is relativised for the individual. The effectiveness of human rights is always reflected in the individual case, above all if members of minorities are involved. The problem of a relativisation of the concept of human rights is rooted not so much in its extension as in the fact that above all authoritarian governments no longer want to acknowledge the universal validity of the classic rights of the individual. Even if a corresponding ”Western” universality claim could be inferred: the universality of the classic individual freedoms must be retained (38) Human rights have long since ceased to be internal affairs of states, even if this is often questioned. The example of European history and the development process of the human rights idea represent the foundation for the support for the realisation of universal human rights policy.

The values discussion between Europe and Asia should not be viewed too one-dimensionally. As in Europe, there are different ideas in Asia too. The complexity of Asian traditions should not be a reason for the failure of a values discussion. It makes sense to take a closer look at the many individual Asian voices in this context. Asia is a rich — for many yet to be discovered — continent, also, and particularly, in the field of philosophical and religious ideas. In this context, it should be pointed out that a partly fashionable, spiritualised transfiguration of Asia takes place in Germany and Europe. Dialogue suffers when it is determined by the one-sided positions of the other side. In Europe too caution should be exercised when basing dialogue on the construct of ”Asian values”. Any fascination for the apparently tempting mixture of economic success and partially democratic authoritarianism should be countered. In the European discussions, for example, positions occasionally emerge which view individualism in one's own cultural tradition, the ”pursuit of happiness”, as a basic evil and seek to prove that citizens would perhaps enjoy greater prosperity and peace without the — allegedly exaggerated — principles of liberality and human rights. This overlooks the fact that a change of mentality and values is also in progress in Asian countries characterised by a growing economic autonomy of the emerging middle class. Despite all the differences there are signs of a convergence here in the ”global village”. It would be counterproductive for Europeans to cast doubt on the success of democracy at a time when democratic convictions are receiving increasing support worldwide.

From a European viewpoint a dialogue on values must be conducted with cautious self-confidence. Nothing indicates that the inherited European idea of the harmony between individual freedom and social responsibility would be unable to meet the challenges of the future. However, it is often intellectually more difficult to advocate the ideas of democracy, since there can be no closed concept of democracy — this is in the nature of a pluralistic approach. Nevertheless, a number of basic principles must exist, such as human dignity, that cannot be questioned.

The dominance of the ”European” and of ”Westernness” is undoubtedly coming to an end — but what will replace it? As a traditional ”melting pot”, the ”dominant power” of the ”West”, the USA, is currently making the painful experience within its society that the ”European” culture is being increasingly displaced (for example, in the curricula of the schools and universities), whereas black persons, Hispanics, Asians, and native Indian inhabitants are demanding greater influence, breaking out of the previous majority culture, setting up their own schools, and providing their own television programmes. The USA, perceived particularly in Asia as an outpost of Western culture and Western thinking, is suffering from a long-term process of internal disintegration, which has also been described as a ”disuniting of America” (39). Is Europe's formative political and cultural influence at its end? Must Europeans in particular prepare for the ”Asian century”(40)? One of the reasons for such a line of argument is the fact that the growth rates of the Asian economies are in some cases overwhelming. The World Bank estimates that seven of the fifteen leading economic powers in the year 2020 will be Asian — with China ahead of the USA in first place (41). Nevertheless, it is not clear how long this rapid economic growth can and will continue at this pace. The American economist Paul Krugmann caused a stir among political and economic leaders, particularly in Southeast Asia, through his article — widely read in Asia — entitled ”The Myth of Asia's Miracle (42). Visitors to Southeast Asia cannot fail to notice the self-doubts expressed at least in face-to-face discussion in view of the fact that the regional productive power is growing much faster than the capability of the region to absorb the products; a much too slow increase in regional purchasing power is blamed as one of the factors for economic uncertainty (43). In addition, uncertainties also exist with respect to political stability in the region in view of the military build-up, especially by China. China and a number of other states, for example, lay claim to the Spratley Islands. Nonetheless, the pride of Asians — especially of Southeast Asians — in their economic successes is more than understandable.

It is also understandable that the Huntington theses meet with such a response in Asia, although they include a number of observations which are empirically irrefutable. Despite all the growing together in the world and the reciprocity of cultural influence an ethnicisation of politics is taking place which will not stop at Europe (conflict in former Yugoslavia, break-up of former Czechoslovakia, growing importance of regions in nation-states — see in this respect the development in northern Italy —, continuing violent conflict in Northern Ireland, in the Basque region or on Corsica). The political developments in Africa should also be mentioned (for example, in Burundi and Rwanda). The significance of the clash of civilisations — in the wake of the de-Westernisation of the world — is also confirmed by the American political scientist Benjamin R. Barber, who perceives the current world society in an explosive central constellation between McWorld” and ”jihad” (44). In his opinion, the global market economy and narrow-minded nationalism are jeopardising the state system. Whereas jihad was pursuing a bloody policy of searching for identity McWorld was fostering an unbloody profit economy (45). Nation-states as historical protectors of democracy — his thesis runs — would be increasingly marginalised by the internationalisation of markets. Huntington's theses can also be couched in the political science question of which role the nation-state can still play today — and, in particular, the USA as the only remaining superpower. Western hegemony is diminishing, but it is not over yet — even though many countries criticise the fact that the Western powers still have a determining influence in major international institutions, such as the UN, World Bank, GATT/WTO. Nevertheless, the thesis of the clash of civilisations and cultures is probably rather oversimplified, since it is unable to explain the numerous conflicts at the end of this millennium. The Huntington theses fail to consider sufficiently the socioeconomic fact that fundamentalist Islam in particular only meets with such support among its ”own” population because the impoverishment of the broad masses, unresolved social problems, and the underdevelopment of the education system foster the proliferation of fundamentalist tendencies. Or to put it another way: the more a social and political development begins in the countries concerned, the less ethnically and culturally orientated fundamentalism can spread. The impact of the Huntington theses, however, can be explained by the fact that multi-ethnic countries (such as the former Soviet Union) fell apart and a tremendous need for new explanations existed after the end of the Cold War. In this respect the values discussion initiated by Asian leaders is a pointer to a worldwide discussion on identity we should not ignore.

Endnotes

1 Cf. Hans Maier, Eine Kultur oder viele? Politische Essays, Stuttgart: Reclam 1995, pp. 35-61.

2 Cf. Florian Coulmas, ”Asianismus — Das neue asiatische Selbstbewusstsein”, in: Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 17/2/1996.

3 Max Weber, Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen, Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie, Vols. 1 and 2, Tuebingen: Mohr 1978.

4 Manfred Mols/Claudia Derichs, ”Das Ende der Geschichte oder ein Zusammenstoss der Zivilisationen?”, in: Zeitschrift fuer Politik, Vol. 42 (new series), No. 3, 1995, pp. 225-249.

5 Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte. Wo stehen wir? Munich: Kindler 1992.

6 Samuel P. Huntington, ”The Clash of Civilisations?”, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22-49.

7 Same author, ”Kampf der Kulturen”, in: Zeit-Punkte No. 4, 1995, Nach uns die Asiaten? Die pazifische Herausforderung p. 12-15, here p. 14.

8 Fareed Zakaria, ”Culture is Destiny. A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1994, pp. 109-126, here p. 125.

9 Cf. inter alia Silke Krieger/Rolf Trauzettel, Chinas Konfuzianismus und die Modernisierung, Mainz: von Hase & Koehler 1990.

10 Coulmas, op. cit.

11 Ibidem, cf. also Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 7/6/1996; Der Spiegel, No. 15, 8/4/1996, pp. 146 f.

12 Cf. Wolfgang Moellers, ”Lektionen aus Fernost”, in: Das Parlament, pp. 52-53, 18/25 December 1992.

13 Zakaria, Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, op. cit, p. 111.

14 Ibidem, p. 113.

15 Cf. Michael Vatikiotis, ”Family Matters — Modern day tensions strain Southeast Asia's social fabric”, in: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1/8/1996, pp. 38-41.

16 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19/6/1996.

17 Shintaro Ishihara became known to the American and German public through his book Wir sind die Weltmacht — Warum Japan die Zukunft gehoert, Bergisch Gladbach: Luebbe 1992.

18 Mahathir Mohammad/Shintaro Ishihara, The Voice of Asia — Two Leaders discuss the coming century, Japan: Kodansha Internat. 1995.

19 Ibidem, p. 80.

20 Zeit-Punkte, op. cit. p. 18.

21 Mahathir, op. cit, p. 75.

22 Ibidem, p. 77.

23 Ibidem, p. 76.

24 Ibidem, pp. 74 f.

25 Kishore Mahbubani, ”The Dangers of Decadence”, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, 1993, pp. 10-14, here p. 12. Zeit-Punkte, op. cit, p. 17.

26 Cf. also in this context Mahathir Mohamad, ”Bosnia and the West”, in: Eastern Economic Review, 7/9/1995, p. 38.

27 Kishore Mahbubani, op. cit., p. 16.

28 Ibidem, p. 18; cf. also Kishore Mahbubani, ”The Pacific Way”, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, 1995, pp. 100-111; also in: Zeit-Punkte, op. cit., pp. 16-18.

29 Interview with Lee Kuan Yew in Zeit-Punkte, op. cit., pp. 19-21, here p. 20.

30 Mahathir, op. cit., p. 82.

31 Ibidem, p. 83.

32 Kim Dae Jung, ”Is culture destiny? The myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values — A Response to Lee Kuan Yew, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994, pp. 189-194 (also in Zeit-Punkte, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

33 Ibidem, p. 191.

34 Petra Kolonko, ”Asiens Werte”, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9/9/1996.

35 Lee Kuan Yew in the Zakaria interview, op. cit., p. 111.

36 Cf. Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 13/1/1996.

37 Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19/12/1995.

38 Cf. on this aspect inter alia: Ludger Kuehnhardt, Die Universalitaet der Menschenrechte, Bonn: Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung 1991; Martin Kriele, Befreiung und politische Aufklaerung, Plaedoyer fuer die Wuerde des Menschen, Freiburg-Basle-Vienna: Herder 1980.

39 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America, New York/London: Norton 1992.

40 Karl Kaiser, ”Vorbereiten auf das ”Asiatische Jahrhundert””, in: Die Zeit, 2/2/1996.

41 Ibidem.

42 Paul Krugmann, ”The Myth of Asia's Miracle”, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, 1994, pp. 62-78.

43 Cf. on this Ruediger Machetzki, ”Kein Kampf der Kulturen”, in: Die Zeit, 1/3/1996.

44 Cf. Benjamim R. Barber, ”Kann die Demokratie McWorld ueberleben?”, in: Werner Weidenfeld, Demokratie am Wendepunkt, Berlin: Siedler 1996, pp. 81-100.

45 Ibidem, p. 85.